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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-A STATUTORY
SCHEME WHEREBY POWER TO DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF MUNICIPAL
INCORPORATION Is ALLOCATED TO LANDOWNERS IN PROPORTION TO
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THEIR LAND AND TO THE EXCLUSION OF
NON-LANDOWNING VOTERS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTON UNLESS THE CLASSIFICATION CAN BE SHOWN TO
BE NECESSARY TO FULFILL A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST-Curtis
v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P.2d 537, 104 Cal. Rptr.
297 (1972).
In 1970 the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors refused to call an in-
corporation election for the proposed city of Rancho Palos Verdes, de-
spite the fact that approximately 63.6 percent of the landowners, rep-
resenting 42.8 percent of the assessed valuation of land in the proposed
city's boundaries, favored incorporation.' The board's refusal was
required by section 34311 of the California Government Code,2 since
protests opposing the incorporation had been filed by persons owning a
majority of the assessed valuation of the land.3 In order to compel the
Board of Supervisors to resume the incorporation proceedings, the pro-
ponents of incorporation petitioned the California Supreme Court for a
writ of mandate4 on the ground that section 34311 was unconstitutional
1. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. 3d 942, 950, 501 P.2d 537, 542, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 302 (1972).
2. CAL. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 34311 (West 1968) provides in relevant part:
The Board shall hold a hearing at the time fixed, and may adjourn the hearing
from time to time, for periods not to exceed two months in all. If at the time
set for the first hearing, there are insufficient written protests filed with the
board to terminate further proceedings, the meeting shall be recessed not less than
14. days, and supplemental protests may be filed within 10 days after the first
hearing.
If upon the final hearing the board of supervisors finds and determines that
written protests to the proposed incorporation have been filed with the board,
signed by qualified signers representing 51 percent of the total assessed valuation
of the land within the boundaries of the proposed incorporation, the jurisdiction
of the board of supervisors shall cease; no election shall be called and no further
petition for the incorporation of any of the same territory shall be initiated for
one year after the date of such determination.
3. A "qualified signer" is defined by section 34301 of the California Government
Code as the "owner of an interest in fee" or the purchaser of land under a written
agreement to buy. CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 34301 (West 1968). For the purposes of the
incorporation procedure, "assessed value of land" does not include the value of im-
provements. Krouser v. County of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 766, 772, 178 P.2d
441, 443 (1947).
4. The writ of mandate was immediately transferred by the Supreme .Court to
the court of appeals. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 97 Cal. Rptr. 44, 45 (1971). There
was a sufficient showing of urgency by the petitioners to justify application to an ap-
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because it violated the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and of the California Constitution.5 They argued that section
34311 permitted the owners of 55 percent of the assessed valuation of
land to thwart the intent of 63.6 percent of the landowners and precluded
non-landowning voters registered in the area from expressing their
opinions on the issue of incorporation.6
The petition for a writ of mandate was transfered by the California
Supreme Court to the court of appeal for determination.' The court of
appeal denied the petition, reasoning that the effect of incorporation on
owners of real property permitted the use of a property value measure
8
similar to the one approved in Schindler v. Palos Verde Irrigation Dis-
trict.' A subsequent petition to the California Supreme Court resulted
in the rejection of the appellate court's reasoning. The supreme court
held that section 34311 violated the equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of the California Constitution since the re-
spondents had failed to show that the discriminatory provisions of section
34311 furthered a "compelling state interest."'"
Before the strict scrutiny of the "compelling state interest" test can be
applied there must be a suspect classification or a fundamental interest
pellate court without first applying to a superior court for relief. See County of
Sacramento v. Hickman, 66 Cal. 2d 841, 845, 428 P.2d 593, 595, 59 Cal. Rptr. 609,
611 (1967).
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21.
6. 7 Cal. 3d at 950, 501 P.2d at 542, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 302. Non-landowning voters
could only express their opinions on the issue of incorporation through an election
procedure. However, the election could not be called once the owners of 51 per cent
or more of the assessed valuation of land filed written protests to the proposed
incorporation. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 34311 (West 1968).
7. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors, 97 Cal. Rptr. 44, 45 (1971).
8. The possibility that additional taxes and laws affecting real property might be
superimposed by the additional level of government was considered to be an interest
distinguishing real property owners from resident voters which would support the Legis-
lature's decision to allow those property owners with more valuable property to have
initial control over the execution or nonexecution of the incorporation plan. Id.
9. 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969). See text accompanying note 23
infra.
10. 7 Cal. 3d at 946, 501 P.2d at 539, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 299. Two equal protection
standards have evolved in the cases. The first includes general social and economic
legislation. If the classifications of different groups created by the legislation are not
arbitrary and are relevant to achieving the objectives of the regulation, such legislation
will be held constitutional. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1960). The
second group of cases involves statutory classifications based on race, color, religion or
alienage, or legislation which impinges on fundamental rights or liberties. These cases
require close court scrutiny and a showing of a "compelling state interest." McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. .184, 192 (1964).
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involved. 1 Voting rights have long been considered fundamental. 2
However, there need not be an election per se for this fundamental in-
terest to be present since state action need only "touch upon" or burden
the right to vote.13  Thus, the strict test has been applied not only
where the right to vote is denied,' 4 but where it has been diluted" or
conditioned on the payment of a fee.' 6 The "compelling state interest"
test has also been applied to pre-election laws which specified unjust
requirements for placing candidates on the ballot.' 7  Consistent with
this trend the Curtis decision applied the concept of "touching upon" to
include a statutory proceeding which may preclude a general election.'
Among the franchise cases two valid state interests for classification
have been evident: (1) to promote intelligent and responsible vot-
ing19 and (2) to separate persons with a substantial interest in the out-
come of an election from those with little or no such interest. 20  The
latter interest, the subject of the dispute in Curtis, has been the focus of
many recent cases wherein the United States Supreme Court has re-
jected classifications based upon a special interest which failed to in-
clude all who are substantially interested.2 ' The California Supreme
11. Fundamental interests have included the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); the right to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); the right to move from state to state, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); and the right to vote, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). If the basis of classification is inherently suspect, such as
race, the statute is subject to close scrutiny by the court. See, e.g., McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410, 420 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
12. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
13. The franchise as a fundamental right has been extended into the peripheries
surrounding voting rights. See notes 15-17 infra and accompanying text.
14. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
15. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
17. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
18. 7 Cal. 3d at 952-55, 501 P.2d 544-46, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 304-06.
19. "The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards designed
to promote intelligent use of the ballot." Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elec-
tions, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
20. Schindler v. Palos Verde Irrigation District, 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1969).
21. In Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), the Court held
invalid a statute limiting the right to vote in school elections to property owners,
renters of taxable property and parents. Excluded voters were held to also have a
substantial interest. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969), the Court
held invalid a Louisiana statute allowing only property taxpayers to vote in special
elections to approve issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility system. Phoe.
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Court found the facts in Curtis to be within the rationale of these cases,
and rejected the purported similarity to the Schindler case. 22  The
Schindler court had upheld a system of voting for irrigation district
trustees based on property value because benefits and burdens from the
district accrued according to the extent of land owned, and votes pro-
portioned to land value fairly distributed voting influence according to
the stake held. The Curtis court determined that, unlike an irrigation
district composed almost exclusively of landowners with a specific in-
terest in the district, as was the situation in Schindler, incorporation of
Rancho Palos Verde would burden and benefit non-landowners as well
as landowners.2" Also, the landowners themselves would be affected
by taxes and ordinances in ways not proportionate to their assessed
land values.24  Thus, the court held:
[N]o compelling state interest requires that nonlandowners be excluded
from the group empowered to decide whether an election to incorporate
a city be called, and no compelling interest is served by allocating power
within that group on the basis of assessed value of land.25
In this way the court followed the recent trend of the United States Su-
preme Court while retaining the Schindler rationale for possible future
application in limited factual contexts. 6
In its decision, the court referred to three classifications that were be-
ing drawn by section 34311: those who own land and those who do
not; those who own more valuable land and those owning less valuable
parcels; and those who own unimproved land and those owning im-
proved land.2 7  The court emphasized that the power derived from the
nix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970), extended Cipriano to general obligation bond
elections.
22. 7 Cal. 3d at 958-59, 501 P.2d at 548-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09.
23. The burden of revenues would derive from sources other than property taxes,
and zoning laws and land use regulations affect the community as a whole and not just
the landowners. 7 Cal. 3d at 961, 501 P.2d at 550, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Also property
taxes affect non-landowners who rent in the area. Usually a percentage of rent is
allocated for taxes, and when property taxes rise so do rents.
24. For instance, property taxes are levied on improvements as well as on the
land, whereas the measurement of assessed land value used in section 34311 did not
include improvements. Also, the direct effect of zoning and land use regulations on
the landowner cannot be measured in terms of assessed value. 7 Cal. 3d at 961, 501
P.2d at 550, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
25. Id.
26. It should be noted that the Curtis court views Schindler as perhaps being
difficult to reconcile with United States Supreme Court cases on the subject. 7 Cal.
3d at 958 n.19, 501 P.2d at 548 n.19, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 308 n.19, citing Burrey v.
Embarcadero Mun. Improvement Dist., 5 Cal. 3d 671, 682 n.8, 488 P.2d 395, 403 n.8,
97 Cal. Rptr. 203, 210 n.8 (1971).
27. 7 Cal. 3d at 954, 501 P.2d at 545, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 305. The third classification
19731
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statute to deny the incorporation election not only harmed the non-
landowner resident voters, but also caused owners of less land or land
of lower valuation to suffer a limitation in voting power and choice.28
The Curtis court, unlike the court in Schindler,29 deliberately consid-
ered all these classifications and implicitly held each of them to consti-
tute unconstitutional violations of due process in the absence of an ade-
quate showing of a "compelling state interest."' 0  The court noted
that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state may
provide procedures for the incorporation of cities in which the issue
never goes to popular vote.31 However, it also noted that this state
power to determine how to create and alter municipal corporations is
not unlimited, 32 and any classifications drawn in the exercise of this
power cannot abridge the equal protection of the laws by allowing one
group to control the other's exercise of a fundamental right.
results from the fact that, for the purposes of the incorporation procedure, assessed
valuation does not include the value of improvements. See note 3 supra.
28. Id. at 955, 501 P.2d at 545, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 305; cf. Adams v. City of
Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970) (a stat-
ute which provided for annexation of an unimproved area which had two-thirds con-
tiguity with an incorporated city without an election was upheld because there was no
class being granted the franchise while it was being denied to another) and Lance v.
Gordon, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (Court refused to apply the "compelling state interest" test
where an extra majority bond election was challenged as a violation of equal protection).
29. Schindler's holding was limited to the situation of voting rights being allocated
among landowners in proportion to the assessed valuation of land held. The case ex-
pressly refrained from a determination of the constitutionality of a property qualifica-
tion for voting. Petitioners in Schindler were held to have no standing to raise the
constitutional claims of non-landowners under section 24, article I of the California
Constitution, which states: "No property qualification shall ever be required for any
person to vote or hold office." CAL. CONST., art. I, § 24. However, the court did not
foreclose inquiry into property qualification issues when raised in a proper factual
context. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 834 n.3, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 62 n.3. It should be noted that
the constitutionality of property qualifications in special district elections is presently
before the United States Supreme Court in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Water-
shed Improvement Dist., 490 P.2d 1069 (Wyo. 1971), prob. juris noted, 407 U.S. 908
(1972).
30. The court gave all of the classifications concerned in Curtis equal weight; equal
concern for the abridged rights of both non-landowners and landowners was evident
throughout the opinion. The court was not concerned with voter qualifications, but
with the denial of an election by petition of owners of a majority of the assessed valua-
tion of land in the proposed incorporation area.
31. 7 Cal. 3d at 954-55 n.16, 501 P.2d at 545 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 305 n.16,
citing Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907). In regard to annexation, cf.
Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), aff'd 399 U.S. 901
(1970), discussed in note 28 supra.
32. 7 Cal. 3d at 951, 501 P.2d at 543, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 303, citing Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342-45 (1960).
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The constitutionality of concurrent majorities33 was an additional
issue raised in the Curtis decision. The respondents had argued that
the statutory plan was constitutional because it did not exclude inter-
ested persons from voting on incorporation, but only conditioned in-
corporation on concurrent approval of two interested groups-the
residents who vote in the incorporation election and the landowners
who may invoke the protest procedure specified in section 34311. The
court rejected this argument and emphasized that section 34311 did
not grant landowners a concurrent voice in the incorporation pro-
ceedings, but gave them a veto power.34  Even if section 34311 were
interpreted as a concurrent majority procedure, the court pointed out,
such a procedure is, at the least,3 5 inherently suspect and can only be
justified by a "compelling state interest."3" The court found no "com-
pelling state interest" which would allow resident landowners to twice
express their preferences regarding the proposed incorporation.
37
The Curtis case calls into constitutional question not only those stat-
utes which apportion voting power according to assessed land value,
33. The court's term "concurrent majorities" refers to a procedure which requires
separate passage of the same provision in each of two or more bodies of the electorate
to effect a single act. Hagman & Disco, One-Man One-Vote as a Constitutional
Imperative for Needed Reform of Incorporation and Boundary Change Laws, 2 URBAN
LAW 459, 470 (1971).
The constitutionality of concurrent majorities is not well-defined in case law. A
requirement of concurrent geographic majorities for amendment of certain state con-
stitutional provisions was held invalid in State v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682,
437 P.2d 143 (1968). A provision of the Hawaii Constitution was struck down be-
cause it required a separate majority of the votes in each of a majority of counties in
order to reapportion the State Senate. Holt v. Richardson, 238 F. Supp. 468 (D.
Hawaii 1965). Contra Keane v. Golka, 304 F. Supp. 331 (D. Neb. 1969), wherein the
court upheld a separate majorities scheme for determining a school district reorganiza-
tion.
34. 7 Cal. 3d at 962, 501 P.2d at 551, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 311. However, a veto power
is what in effect is given by an actual concurrent majority proceeding. If one group does
not give its approval, the measure is not passed. The mechanics of a concurrent elec-
tion are different from the proceedings of section 34311, but the result is similar.
35. Cf. Lance v. Gordon, 403 U.S. 1, 8 n.6 (1971), where the Court stated: "We
intimate no view on the constitutionality of a provision requiring unanimity or giving a
veto power to a very small group. . . ." with the majority opinion in Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 215 (1970), where the Court dismissed without discussion
Mr. Justice Stewart's argument that the statute did not exclude non-landowners, but
provided for a concurrent majority of property owners and the city council elected by
the general populous.
36. 7 Cal. 3d at 962, 501 P.2d at 551, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
37. Residents have a constitutional right to vote in municipal elections. Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968). However, non-residents have no such
right. 7 Cal. 3d at 963, 501 P.2d at 551, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 311, citing Chadwell v.
Cain, 160 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ohio 1959).
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but also those which authorize property ownership qualifications in
election-related proceedings where the issue is deemed to affect land-
owners more substantially than non-landowners. Some forty-two stat-
utes restrict to landowners the right to sign petitions or instruments of
protest.38  Most of these statutes involve special districts similar to the
irrigation district in Schindler, where an adequate showing of an ex-
press special interest will most likely serve to establish a "compelling
state interest. '3 9  However, other statutes, particularly other Govern-
ment Code sections dealing with incorporation and annexation of cities,
may be deeply affected by this decision.40  They may be so deeply af-
fected as to require a complete revamping of the incorporation and an-
nexation procedures.4"
L.D.R.
38. 7 Cal. 3d at 960, 501 P.2d at 549, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
39. Id. But cf. notes 21 & 26 supra.
40. Several other Government Code sections concerning incorporation have prop-
erty qualifications. To incorporate a city in California 25 to 50 qualified signers
must file a notice of intention. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 34302.5 (West 1968).
A qualified signed is a landowner. Id. at § 34301. A second petition must be signed
by at least 25 percent of the qualified signers representing at least 25 percent of the
assessed value of the land. Id. at § 34303.
41. Such a complete revamping is suggested in Hagman & Disco, One-Man
One-Vote as a Constitutional Imperative for Needed Reform of Incorporation and
Boundary Change Laws, 2 URBAN LAw 459 (1971).
[Vol. 6
